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Abstract—Encrypted computing is an emerging technology
based on a processor that ‘works encrypted’, taking encrypted
inputs to encrypted outputs while data remains in encrypted form
throughout. It aims to secure user data against possible insider
attacks by the operator and operating system (who do not know
the user’s encryption key and cannot access it in the processor).
Formally ‘obfuscating’ compilation for encrypted computing is
such that on each recompilation of the source code, machine code
of the same structure is emitted for which runtime traces also all
have the same structure but each word beneath the encryption
differs from nominal with maximal possible entropy across
recompilations. That generates classic cryptographic semantic
security for data, relative to the security of the encryption, but
it guarantees only single words and an adversary has more
than that on which to base decryption attempts. This paper
extends the existing integer-based technology to doubles, floats,
arrays, structs and unions as data structures, covering ANSI
C. A single principle drives compiler design and improves the
existing security theory to quantitative results: every arithmetic
instruction that writes must vary to the maximal extent possible.
Index Terms—obfuscation, compilation, encrypted computing
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines how to make ‘formally obfuscating’
compilation for encrypted computing work for the complex
data structures of standard programming languages such as
ANSI C [1], with its long long, float, double, array, struct
(record) and union data types. How to do it for 32-bit integer-
only computing was established in [2] (and is recapitulated in
Section IV). Integers are enough for formal purposes but this
paper bootstraps that to cover practice and heterogeneous data
structures with a simple approach that reworks all the theory.
Encrypted computing means running on a processor that
‘works profoundly encrypted’ in user mode (in which access
is always limited to certain registers and memory), taking
encrypted inputs to encrypted outputs via encrypted interme-
diate values in registers and memory. The processor works
unencrypted in the conventional way in operator mode, which
has unrestricted access to all registers and memory. Since user
data exists only in encrypted form, operator-level privilege
gives no ‘magic’ access to the decrypted form of user data (the
user can interpret the data – elsewhere – as they know the key).
Several prototype processors that support encrypted computing
at near conventional speeds already exist (see Section II).
Platform issues such as the real randomness of random
numbers or power side-channel information leaks are not at
question here. Keys may be installed at manufacture, as with
Smartcards [3], or uploaded in public view to the write-only
internal store via a Diffie-Hellman circuit [4], and are not
accessible via the programming instruction interface. Key
management is not an issue via a simple argument: if (a)
user B’s key is still loaded when user A runs, then A’s
programs do not run correctly because the running encryption
is wrong for them, and if (b) B’s key is in the machine
together with B’s program when A runs, then user A cannot
supply appropriate encrypted inputs nor interpret the encrypted
output. The question of security user on user essentially boils
down to security for user mode against operator mode as the
most powerful potential adversary, and it is proved in [5]
that (i) a processor that supports encrypted computing, (ii)
an appropriate machine code instruction set architecture, (iii)
a compiler with an ‘obfuscating’ property, together formally
provide classic cryptographic semantic security [6] (CSS),
relative to the security of the encryption, for user data against
operator mode as adversary. A translation is that encrypted
computing cannot in itself further compromise the encryption,
and ‘good’ security amounts to choosing secure encryption.
The obfuscation property (iii) for the compiler simply
requires it to produce code such that an adversary cannot
count on 0, 1, 2 and other low values being the most common
to appear (encrypted) in a program trace. That would be the
case if the program were written by a human and compiled to
machine code conventionally, and it would allow statistically-
based dictionary attacks [7] against the encryption. The prop-
erty is that no value may appear with any higher frequency
than any other, both for observations of single words and for
simultaneous observations at multiple points in a trace. The
property is violated, for example, in implementations [8] of
fully homomorphic encryptions [9], [10] (FHE), where the
output of a 1-bit AND (multiplication) operation is predictably
0 with 75% probability (see Box 1a).1
This document will use ‘the operator’ for operator mode.
A subverted operating system is ‘the operator’, as is a human
with administrative privileges, perhaps obtained by physically
interfering with the boot process. A scenario for an attack
1That 0 is a probable outcome from multiplication in a FHE E is not an
extra liability because in 1-bit arithmetic E[x] + E[x] = E[0] with certainty
from any observed encrypted value E[x]. It can also be relied on that E[1]
is one of the inputs in any nontrivial calculation because ‘all-zeros’ as inputs
propagates through to all-zeros as output via E[0]+E[0] = E[0]∗E[0] = E[0].
Box 1
(a) A fully homomorphic encryp-
tion (FHE) E of 1-bit data does
not have the cryptographic seman-
tic security (CSS) property.
E [0] ∗ E [0] = E [0]
E [0] ∗ E [1] = E [0]
E [1] ∗ E [0] = E [0]
E [1] ∗ E [1] = E [1]
Guessing 0 as outcome is right
75% of the time.
(b) A FHE program that adds
2-bit data to itself:
E [0] + E [0] = E [0]
E [1] + E [1] = E [2]
E [2] + E [2] = E [0]
E [3] + E [3] = E [2]
has output y = 2x that is
100% even, breaking CSS.
by the operator is where cinematographic imagery is being
rendered in a server farm. The computer operators have an
opportunity to pirate for profit portions of the movie before
release and they may be tempted. Another scenario is the
processing in a specialised facility of satellite photos of a
foreign power’s military installations to spot changes. If an
operator (or hacked operating system) can modify the data to
show no change where there has been some, then that is an
option for espionage. A successful attack by the operator is
one that discovers the plaintext of user data or alters it to order.
A processor starts in operator mode when it is switched
on, in order to load operating system code into reserved areas
of memory from disk, and conventional application software
relies on the processor to change from user mode to operator
mode and back for the operating system system support
routines (e.g., disk I/O) as required, so the operator mode
of working of the processor intrinsically presents difficulties
as an adversary. Nevertheless, the CSS result of [5] means
the operator cannot directly or indirectly by deterministic
or stochastic means read a word of user data beneath the
encryption, even to a probability slightly above chance. Nor
can user data be rewritten deliberately, even stochastically on
the balance of averages, to a value beneath the encryption that
is independently defined, such as pi, or the encryption key (see
[5] again). That is a good start on answering (positively) to the
question of the security of encrypted computing as a whole, but
it might be, for example, that an adversary can detect that an
anomaly in satellite photos has been found, though they cannot
tell what it is. A simple example is a one-instruction program
that adds its input to itself (Box 1b). An observer would not
know what the input is nor what the output is, but can be sure
that the latter is twice the former. It terms of pairs x, y of
input/output values, only four of sixteen are possible, making
a statistical dictionary attack feasible. Ideally, a compiler for
encrypted computing should produce program codes such that
biases in joint frequencies of values beneath the encryption are
removed. In principle, it can do that by injecting some very
noisy signal of its own that swamps any existing biases.
An ‘obfuscating’ compiler (iii) like that is described in
[11] and is proved in [5] to generate object code that varies
on recompilation of the same source code but always looks
the same to an adversary, the difference consisting entirely
of the encrypted constants embedded in the code (which
the adversary a priori cannot read, lacking the encryption
key). Runtime traces also ‘look the same,’ with the same
instructions n the same order, the same jumps and branches,
reading from and writing to the same registers. But the data
beneath the encryption varies arbitrarily and independently
from recompilation to recompilation at each point in the trace,
subject only to the constraints that a copy instruction preserves
the value, and the variations introduced by the compiler are
always equal where control paths join (i.e., at either end
of a loop, after conditional blocks, at subroutine returns, at
either end of a goto). Within those constraints, compiled codes
vary as much as is possible, in a way that can be quantified
precisely. A new principle subsuming that is put forward here:
Every arithmetic instruction that writes should intro-
duce maximal possible entropy to the program trace.
(H˜)
as a single driver for the approach, reworking existing theory.
Entropy is measured across recompilations, so what this
means is that the compiler fully exercises its possibilities for
varying the trace at each opportunity in a compiled program.
It does not, for example, always use 1 as the increment in an
addition instruction when the possibility exists of doing some-
thing different. If two addition instructions are introduced, then
both vary independently across compilations. The principle
(H˜) allows CSS and stronger formulations of security relative
to the security of encryption to be proved (see Section IX).
The compiler of [11] implements the principle (H˜) for a
minimal C-like language with 32-bit signed integers beneath
the encryption as the only data type. The extension of com-
pilation to ANSI C pointers, arrays, structs (record types) and
unions, arbitrarily nested, will be described in this paper. All
atomic data types (int, short int, long int, long long int, signed
and unsigned, float and double float) are covered. Pointers
must be declared as restricted to a named area of memory (an
array), which is a limitation with respect to the standard.
Encrypted 32-bit integer arithmetic will be taken as prim-
itive. Since hardware is not the focus here, for further con-
venience, encrypted 64-bit integer arithmetic will also be
assumed for the target platform, carried out on two encrypted
32-bit integers representing the high and low bits respectively
(that can be supported in software, as an alternative).
Encrypted 32-bit floating point arithmetic will also be taken
as primitive, on the same rationale. It works on encrypted 32-
bit integers each encoding a 32-bit float bitwise as specified
in IEEE standard 754 (ISO standard 60559; see the good
commentaries on the standard in [12] and [13]). Encrypted
64-bit floating point arithmetic will be taken as primitive too,
working on two encrypted 32-bit integers encoding separately
the high and low bits of a 64-bit double float as per the
IEEE 754 standard. All these primitives are supported by
at least one of the prototype processors referenced in Sec-
tion II. Coincidentally, the IEEE floating point test suite at
http://jhauser.us/arithmetic/TestFloat.html consisting of 22,000
lines of C code is one of the compilation and execution
tests for our own prototype compiler, so we can be sure
that encrypted floating point arithmetic in software would
work if we had to resort to it, and that our test platform’s
implementation in hardware is correct.
This article is organised as follows. Section II introduces
extant platforms for encrypted computing and discusses known
elements of the theory. Section III introduces a modified
OpenRISC (http://openrisc.io) machine code instruction set for
encrypted computing first described in [11], and its abstract
semantics. Section IV resumes ‘obfuscating’ integer-based
compilation as in [11]. Section V extends it to ramified
basic types such as long integers and floats, Section VI deals
with arrays, Section VII with ‘struct’ (record) types, and
Section VIII with union types. The theory is developed in
Section IX, quantifying the entropy in a runtime trace for code
compiled according to the principle (H˜) and characterising the
compilation as ‘best possible’ with respect to that. Section X
discusses the further implications for security in this context.
NOTATION
Encryption is denoted by xE = E [x] of plaintext value x.
Decryption is x = D[xE ]. The operation on the ciphertext
domain corresponding to f on the plaintext domain is written
[o], where xE [o] yE = E [x o y].
II. BACKGROUND
Several fast processors for encrypted computing are de-
scribed in [14]. Those include the 32-bit KPU [15] with 128-
bit AES encryption [16], which benchmarks at approximately
the speed of a 433MHz classic Pentium, and the slightly older
16-bit HEROIC [17], [18] with 2048-bit Paillier encryption
[19], which runs like a 25KHz Pentium, as well as the recently
announced CryptoBlaze [20], 10× faster.
The machine code instruction set defining the programming
interface is important because a conventional instruction set is
insecure against powerful insiders, who may, for example, steal
an (encrypted) user datum x and put it through the machine’s
division instruction to get x/x encrypted, an encrypted 1. Then
any desired encrypted y may be constructed by repeatedly
applying the machine’s addition instruction. By using the in-
struction set’s comparator instructions (testing 231≤z, 230≤z,
. . . ) on an encrypted z and subtracting on branch, z may be
obtained efficiently bitwise. That is a chosen instruction attack
(CIA) [21]. The instruction set has to resist such attacks, but
the compiler must be involved too, else there would be known
plaintext attacks (KPAs) [22] based on the idea that not only do
instructions like x−x predictably favour one value over others
(the result there is always x−x=0), but human programmers
intrinsically use values like 0, 1 more often. The compiler’s
job is to even out those statistics.
A compiler must do that even for object code consisting of
a single instruction. That gives the conditions on the machine
code instruction design (first described in [11]) shown in
Box II): instructions must (1) execute atomically, or recent
attacks such as Meltdown [23] and Spectre [24] against Intel
Box 2: Machine code conditions. Instructions . . .
• are a black box from the perspective of the program-
ming interface, with no intermediate states; (1)
• take encrypted inputs to encrypted outputs; (2)
• are adjustable via (encrypted) embedded constants to
produce any offset in (decrypted) inputs/outputs; (3)
• are such that there are no collisions between en-
crypted instruction constants and runtime values. (4)
might become feasible, must (2) work with encrypted values
or an adversary could read them, and (3) must be adjustable
via embedded encrypted constants to offset the values beneath
the encryption by arbitrary deltas. The condition (4) is for the
security proofs and amounts to different padding or blinding
factors for encrypted program constants and runtime values.
In this document (4) will be strengthened to also:
There are no collisions between (encrypted) constants
in instructions with different opcodes, or differently
positioned constants where the opcode is equal. (4∗)
Padding beneath the encryption enforces that. The aim is
that experiments by the adversarial operator that transplant
constants from one instruction to another cannot be performed.
With (4), experiments that use runtime encrypted data value
as an instruction constant, or vice versa, are ruled out. With
(4*) an adversary can modify copied instructions even less.
The salient effect of a machine code instruction set satisfy-
ing (1-4) is proved in [5] to be:
A machine code instruction program and its runtime
trace (with encrypted data) can be interpreted arbi-
trarily with respect to the plaintext data beneath the
encryption at any point in memory and in the control
graph by any observer and experimenter who does not
have the key to the encryption, with the proviso that
copy instructions preserve value and the delta from
nominal at start and end of a loop is the same. (∀I)
That means that picking any one point in the trace, the word
beneath the encryption there varies over a 32-bit range from
recompilation to recompilation with flat probability, indepen-
dently of (almost) any other point in the trace. The exceptional
points that are not independent are data pairs that are the
inputs to and outputs from a copy instruction, and also, data
measured in the same register or memory location respectively
at the beginning and end of a loop must have the same deltas
from nominal values beneath the encryption, whatever that
delta is. To keep programs working correctly the compiler
has to arrange that they are same. The proviso actually holds
wherever two control paths join in the machine code, at the
beginning of a loop but also at the target of any jump or
conditional branch, in particular at the label of a backward-
going jump and multiple entry or exit points of a subroutine.
The rationale behind (∀I) is that an arbitrary delta from
the nominal value can be introduced by the compiler in one
Box 3: What the compiler does:
(A) change only encrypted program constants, generating via (3) an
obfuscation scheme of planned offsets from nominal values for
instruction inputs and outputs beneath the encryption;
(B) make runtime traces look unchanged, apart from differences in the
(encrypted) instruction constants and data (A);
(C) equiprobably generate all obfuscation schemes satisfying (A), (B).
instruction and changed again in the next instruction, via the
embedded instruction constants of (3), while (1-2) prevent
the adversary from knowing. Note that (1) means ‘no side-
channels’. The compiler’s job boils down to:
Varying the encrypted instruction constants (3) from
recompilation to recompilation so deltas from nom-
inal in the runtime data beneath the encryption at
each point in the trace are equiprobable. (EP)
The compiler strategy in [11] does that. It is subsumed by (H˜)
here, but [5] shows (∀I) implies (EP), which in turn implies:
Cryptographic semantic security (CSS) holds for user
data against insiders not privy to the encryption. (⋓

)
I.e., encrypted computation does not compromise encryption.
How the ‘equiprobable variation’ is obtained by the com-
piler is encapsulated in Box 3: a new obfuscation scheme
is generated at each recompilation. That is a planned offset
delta for the data beneath the encryption in every memory
and register location per point in the program control graph.
Precisely, the compiler C[−] translates an expression e that
is to end up in register r at runtime into machine code mc and
generates a 32-bit offset ∆e for r at the point in the program
where it is loaded with the result of the expression e. That is
C[e]r = (mc,∆e) (5)
The offset ∆e is the obfuscation for register r at the point
where the encrypted value of the expression is written to it.
Let s(r) be the content of register r in state s of the
processor at runtime. The machine code mc’s action changes
state s0 to an s1 with a ciphertext in r whose plaintext value
differs by ∆e from the nominal value e:
s0
mc
 s1 where s1(r) = E [e+∆e] (6)
Bitwise exclusive-or or the binary operation of another math-
ematical group are alternatives to addition in the e+∆e.
The encryption E is shared with the user and the processor
but not the potential adversaries: the operator and operating
system. The randomly generated offsets ∆e of the obfuscation
scheme are known to the user, but not the processor and not the
operator and operating system. The user compiles the program
and sends it to the processor to be executed and needs to
know the offsets on the inputs and outputs. That allows the
right inputs to be created and sent off for processing on the
encrypted computing platform, and allows sense to be made
of the outputs received back.
TABLE I
INTEGER PORTION OF FXA MACHINE CODE INSTRUCTION SET FOR
ENCRYPTED WORKING – ABSTRACT SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS.
op. fields mnem. semantics
add r0 r1 r2 k
E add r0←r1 [+] r2 [+] k
E
sub r0 r1 r2 k
E subtract r0←r1 [−] r2 [+] k
E
mul r0 r1 r2 k
E
0
kE
1
kE
2
multiply r0←(r1 [−] k
E
1
) [ ∗ ](r2 [−] k
E
2
) [+] kE
0
div r0 r1 r2 k
E
0
kE
1
kE
2
divide r0←(r1 [−] k
E
1
) [÷](r2 [−] k
E
2
) [+] kE
0
. . .
mov r0 r1 move r0←r1
beq i r1 r2 k
E branch if b thenpc←pc+i, b⇔ r1 [=] r2 [+] k
E
bne i r1 r2 k
E branch if b thenpc←pc+i, b⇔ r1 [ 6=] r2 [+] k
E
blt i r1 r2 k
E branch if b thenpc←pc+i, b⇔ r1 [<] r2 [+]k
E
bgt i r1 r2 k
E branch if b thenpc←pc+i, b⇔ r1 [>] r2 [+]k
E
ble i r1 r2 k
E branch if b thenpc←pc+i, b⇔ r1 [≤] r2 [+]k
E
bge i r1 r2 k
E branch if b thenpc←pc+i, b⇔ r1 [≥] r2 [+]k
E
. . .
b i branch pc ← pc + i
sw (kE
0
)r0 r1 store memJr0 [+] k
E
0
K ← r1
lw r0 (k
E
1
)r1 load r0 ← memJr1 [+]k
E
1
K
jr r jump pc ← r
jal j jump ra ← pc + 4; pc ← j
j j jump pc ← j
nop no-op
LEGEND
r – register indices k – 32-bit integers pc – prog. count reg.
j – program count ‘←’ – assignment ra – return addr. reg.
E[ ] – encryption i – pc increment r – register content
kE – encrypted value E[k] xE [o] yE = E[x o y] xE [R] yE ⇔ xR y
III. FXA INSTRUCTIONS
A ‘fused anything and add’ (FxA) [11] instruction set archi-
tecture (ISA) is the general target here, satisfying conditions
(1-4) of Section I. The integer portion is shown in Table I. It is
adapted from the open standard OpenRISC instruction set v1.1
http://openrisc.io/or1k.html. That has about 200 instructions
(6-bit opcode plus variable minor opcodes) separated into
single and double precision integer and floating point and
vector subsets with instructions all 32 bits long and the FxA in-
struction set follows that design closely. FxA instructions, like
OpenRISC instructions, access up to three 32 general purpose
registers (GPRs) per instruction, designated in contiguous 5-bit
plaintext specifier fields within the instruction.
To give an idea of what FxA machine code looks like ‘in
action’, a trace of code compiled for the Ackermann function2
[25] is shown in Table II. For readability here, the final delta
for the return value in register v0 is set to zero. That function
is the most computationally complex function theoretically
possible, stepping up in complexity for each increment of the
first argument, so it is a good test of correct compilation.
A. Prefix Instructions
FxA instructions may need to contain 128-bit or longer en-
crypted constants, so some adaptation of the basic OpenRISC
architecture is required for that to be possible. A ‘prefix’
instruction takes care of it, supplying extra bits as necessary.
Each prefix instruction instruction s 32 bits long, but several
may be concatenated.
2Ackermann C code: int A(int m,int n) { if (m == 0) return n+1; if (n
== 0) return A(m-1, 1); return A(m-1, A(m, n-1)); }.
B. Single Precision Floating Point
In addition to the integer instructions of Table I, there may be
floating point instructions addf, subf, mulf etc. paralleling the
OpenRISC floating point subset. The contents of registers and
memory for floating point operations are the encryptions of 32-
bit integers that themselves encode floating point numbers (21
mantissa bits, 10 exponent bits, 1 sign bit) via the IEEE754
standard encoding.
Definition 1. Let
.
∗ denote the floating point multiplication on
plaintext integers encoding IEEE 754 floats, and use the same
convention for other arithmetic operations and relations.
Let [
.
∗ ] be the corresponding operation in the ciphertext
domain, following the notation convention at end of Section I.
Then the floating point multiplication instruction semantics is
r0 ← (r1 [−] k
E
1 ) [
.
∗ ] (r2 [−] k
E
2 ) [+] k
E
0 (
.
∗)
The − and + are the ordinary plaintext integer subtraction
and addition operations respectively, and [−] and [+] are the
corresponding operations in the ciphertext domain (see Nota-
tion in Section I). That is, the FxA floating point multiplication
takes the encrypted integers representing (in IEEE 754 format)
floating point numbers that have been offset as integers, undoes
the offsets then multiplies them as floats, obtaining the IEEE
754 integer representation before offsetting as integer again.
The operation is atomic, as required by (1) of Box II, leaving
no trace if aborted. The offsets ki satisfy the requirement (3).
The FxA set in use in our prototypes has two encrypted con-
stants for a floating point test condition in branch instructions.
The floating point branch-if-equal instruction calculates
(r1 [−] k
E
1 ) [
.
=] (r2 [−] k
E
2 ) (
.
=)
where
.
= is the floating point comparison on integers encoding
floats via IEEE754, and [
.
=] is the corresponding test in the
ciphertext domain, with xE [
.
=] yE ⇔ x
.
= y. The subtraction is
as integers on the encoding, not floating point. The operation
is atomic, leaving no trace if aborted or interrupted, as required
by (1) of Box II, and all encrypted operations in the processor
(should and do) take the same time and power on all operands.
C. Instruction Diddling
Condition (2) of Box II requires there to be one more constant
physically present in each branch instruction, an encrypted bit
k0 that decides if the 1-bit result of the test is to be inverted or
not. That is because the test outcome is observable by whether
the branch is taken or not, so by condition (3) it should be
variable via an encrypted constant in the instruction. The bit
changes equals to not-equals and vice versa, a less-than into a
greater-than-or-equal-to, and so on. The bit is said to diddle the
instruction. In practice, the bit is composed from the padding
bits in the other constants in the instruction, so it has not been
mentioned explicitly in Table I, where the branch semantics
shown are after the diddle.
The opcode in the instruction is in plaintext, but which
branch in the control graph is which is hidden by the diddle.
TABLE II
TRACE FOR ACKERMANN(3,1), RESULT 13.
PC instruction update trace
...
35 add t0 a0 zer E[-86921031] t0 = E[-86921028]
36 add t1 zer zer E[-327157853] t1 = E[-327157853]
37 beq t0 t1 2 E[240236822]
38 add t0 zer zer E[-1242455113] t0 = E[-1242455113]
39 b 1
41 add t1 zer zer E[-1902505258] t1 = E[-1902505258]
42 xor t0 t0 t1 E[-1734761313] E[1242455113] E[1902505258]
t0 = E[-17347613130]
43 beq t0 zer 9 E[-1734761313]
53 add sp sp zer E[800875856] sp = E[1687471183]
54 add t0 a1 zer E[-915514235] t0 = E[-915514234]
55 add t1 zer zer E[-1175411995] t1 = E[-1175411995]
56 beq t0 t1 2 E[259897760]
57 add t0 zer zer E[11161509] t0 = E[11161509]
...
143 add v0 t0 zer E[42611675] v0 = E[13]
...
147 jr ra # (return E[13] in v0)
Legend: (registers) a0 = function argument; sp = stack pointer; t0,
t1 = temporaries; v0 = return value; zer = null placeholder.
D. The Debatable Equals Branch Instruction
Diddling works well to disguise less-than instructions and
order inequalities in general, but not for equals versus not-
equals. What the instruction is, equals or not-equals, may
be guessed by what proportion of operands cause a jump at
runtime. If almost all do then that is a not-equals test. If few
do then that is an equality test. Trying the same operand both
sides is almost guaranteed to cause equality to fail because of
the embedded constants k1, k2 in (
.
=), so if it succeeds instead,
the equality instruction has likely been diddled to not-equals.
So whether the test succeeds or not at runtime is detectable
in practice for an equality/not-equals branch instruction, con-
tradicting (2). To beat that, the compiler described in [11]
randomly changes the way it interprets the original boolean
source code expression at every level so it cannot be told if
the source code, not the object code, had an equality or an not-
equals test. It independently and randomly decides as it works
upwards through a boolean expression if the source code at
that point is to be interpreted by a truthteller, who says ‘true’
when true is meant and ‘false’ when false is meant, or by
a liar, who says ‘false’ when true is meant and ‘true’ when
false is meant. It equiprobably generates, at each level in the
boolean expression, liar code and uses the branch-if-not-equal
machine code instruction for an equality test, or truthteller
code and uses the branch-if-equal instruction.
With that compile strategy, if the equals branch instruction
jumps or not at runtime does not relate statistically to what
the boolean in the source code should be. Condition (3) of
Box II on the output of the instruction is effectively vacuous
with respect to the source, as there is no definite meaning to it
jumping. An observer who sees it jump does not know if that
is the result of a truthteller’s interpretation of an equals test in
the source code and it has come out true at runtime, or it is
the result of the liar’s interpretation and it has come out false.
Ditto not-equals. This equates to a (structured) garbled circuit
construction in the classical sense of [26]. While a structured
boolean expression reveals its intermediates as outputs to an
observer too, the classical result has it that no output values
can be deciphered by an observer who does not already know
which is being ‘lied’ about, and which not.
For other comparison tests, just as many operand pairs cause
a branch one way as the other,3 and make it indistinguishable
whether the opcode is diddled or not. Still, the truthteller/liar
compile strategy is used there too. An equality test cannot
be recreated by an adversary as x≤y and y≤x because
only x≤y+k is available in FxA, for unknown constant k.
Reversing operands is allowed by (4*) but produces y≤x+k,
not y+k≤x. An estimate for k can be made by the proportion
of pairs (x, y) that satisfy the conjunction of the inequality and
the reversed inequality. In particular whether k<0 is signalled
by the absence of pairs that satisfy both inequalities. But
diddling means the conjunctions might be x>y+k and y>x+k
instead, and those have no solutions when −k−1 is negative.
So either k<0 or k≥0, which gives nothing away.
Note for the general description below of the compiler
strategy established in [11] that ‘liar’ amounts to adding a delta
equal to 1 mod 2 to a boolean 1-bit result, and ‘truthteller’
amounts to adding a delta equal to 0 mod 2.
IV. OBFUSCATING COMPILATION
A compiler built to obfuscate in the sense of this article works
with a database D : Loc→Off containing a (here 32-bit)
integer offset ∆l of type Off for data in register or memory
location l (type Loc). The offset is a delta by which the runtime
data underneath the encryption is to vary from nominal at a
given point in the program, and the database D comprises the
obfuscation scheme. It is varied by the compiler as it makes
a pass through the source code.
The compiler (any compiler) also maintains a conventional
database of type L : Var → Loc binding source variables to
registers and memory locations. In our prototype an intermedi-
ate layer (RALPH: Register ALlocation in Physical Hardware)
optimises the mapping and detail of this is omitted here.
A. Expressions
In [11], a generic (non-side-effecting) integer expression
compiler putting its result in register r is described with type:
C
L[ : ]r : DB× Expr→ MC× Off (7)
where MC is the type of machine code, a sequence of FxA
instructions mc, and Off is the type of the integer offset ∆r
from nominal that the compiler intends for the result in r
beneath the encryption when the machine code is evaluated at
runtime. The aim is to satisfy (EP) by varying ∆r arbitrarily
and equiprobably from recompilation to recompilation.
To translate x+y, for example, where x and y are signed
integer expressions, the compiler first emits machine code mc1
computing expression x in register r1 with offset ∆x. It then
3In 2s complement arithmetic x < y is the same as x− y = z and z < 0
and exactly half of the range satisfies z < 0 and exactly half satisfies z ≥ 0.
emits machine code mc2 computing expression y in register
r2 with offset ∆y. That is
(mc1,∆x) = C
L[D : x]r1
(mc2,∆y) = C
L[D : y]r2
It then decides a random offset ∆e for the whole expression
e = x+y and emits the FxA integer addition instruction with
abstract semantics r←r1[+]r2[+]k
E to return the result in r:
C
L[D : x+ y]r = (mce,∆e) (8)
mce = mc1;mc2; add r r1 r2 k
E
k = ∆e−∆x−∆y
The final offset ∆e for the runtime result in r beneath the
encryption may be freely chosen, as (EP) stipulates.
That is carrying through the global requirement for compiler
constructions (H˜): the code takes the opportunity of one new
arithmetic instruction that writes, here add, to generate one
new, independent, randomly chosen offset ∆e for the written
location r. The same will be true of the compilation of the
subexpressions x, y: each arithmetic machine code instruction
emitted introduces an independent random delta in its target.
B. Statements
Statements do not produce a result, instead they have a side-
effect. Let Stat be the type of statements. The statement
compiler in [11] works not by returning an offset, as for
expressions, but a new scheme for offsets at multiple locations:
C
L[ : ] : DB× Stat→ DB×MC (9)
Recall that a database D of type DB holds the obfuscation
scheme (the offset deltas from nominal values beneath the
encryption in all locations) as the compiler works through
the code, and consider an assignment z=e to a source code
variable z, which the location database L says is bound in
register r=Lz. Let a pair in the cross product DB×MC be
written D : mc for readability. First code mce for evaluating
expression e in temporary register t0 at runtime is emitted via
the expression compiler as already described:
(mce,∆e) = C
L[D : e]t0
Offset ∆e is generated by the expression compiler for the
result e in t0. A short form add instruction with semantics
r ← t0 [+] kE to change offset ∆e to a new randomly chosen
offset ∆′r in register r is emitted next:
C
L[D : z=e] = D′ : mce; add r t0 k
E (10)
k = ∆′r −∆e
The change to the database of offsets is at index r. An initial
offset Dr = ∆r changes to D′r = ∆′r. The new offset has
been freely and randomly chosen by the compiler, supporting
(EP), and the one new arithmetic machine code instruction
emitted, add, to write the expression in the target variable
incorporates one new random delta, supporting (H˜).
V. LONG BASIC TYPES
Double length (64-bit) plaintext integers x can be viewed as
concatenated 32-bit integers x = xH . xL, the high and low
32 bits of x respectively. In the processor, the encryption of
x occupies two registers or two memory locations, containing
the encrypted values E [xH ], E [xL] respectively.
Definition 2. Encryption of 64-bit integers x concatenates the
encryptions of their 32-bit high and low bit components:
xE = E [x] = E [xH . xL] = E [xH ] . E [xL]
The FxA instructions for dealing with encrypted 64-bit values
necessarily contain (encrypted) 64-bit constants.
A. Long Long Integers
The 64-bit integer type is known in C as ‘long long’.
Definition 3. Let −2 and +2 be the two-by-two independent
application of respectively 32-bit addition and 32-bit subtrac-
tion to the pairs of 32-bit plaintext integer high-bit and low-bit
components of 64-bit integers, with similar notation for other
binary operators. I.e. and e.g.:
(u1 . l1)+
2 (u2 . l2) = (u1+ u2) . (l1 + l2)
Definition 4. Let ∗˜ denote the usual plaintext multiplication on
64-bit ‘long long’ integers, and similarly for other operators.
The FxA 64-bit multiplication operation on operands E [x],
E [y] has semantics:
E [(x −2 k1) ∗˜ (y −
2 k2) +
2 k0] (∗˜)
where k0, k1, k2 are 64-bit plaintext integer constants embed-
ded encrypted in the instruction as kEi , i = 0, 1, 2. Putting it
in terms of the effect on register contents, the FxA long long
multiplication instruction semantics is:
rH0 . r
L
0 ← (r
H
1
. rL1 [−
2] kE1 ) [ ∗˜ ](r
H
2
. rL2 [−
2] kE2 ) [+
2] kE0
For encrypted (and unencrypted) 64-bit operations the proces-
sor partitions the register set into pairs referred to by one name
each. In those terms the semantics is simplified to:
r0 ← (r1 [−
2] kE1 ) [ ∗˜ ](r2 [−
2] kE2 ) [+
2] kE0
That is written mull r0 r1 r2 k
E
0 k
E
1 k
E
2 in assembler, following
the 32-bit instruction pattern. The operation is atomic (1).
The other instructions for ‘long long’ integer arithmetic in
FxA also match the architecture of the corresponding 32-bit
integer instruction (Table I), with longer encrypted constants
and the ‘two-at-a-time’ register naming convention, and an l
suffix on the name in assembler. Only the different opcode and
the extra prefixes distinguish the long forms ‘on the wire’.
The pattern for compiled code generated for long long
integer expressions and statements on the encrypted computing
platform follows exactly that for 32-bit expressions and state-
ments but using the ‘l’ instructions. Exactly one new (64-bit)
arithmetic instruction that writes is issued with each compiler
construct. It contains just one 64-bit (encrypted) constant that
allows the 64-bit (i.e. 2 × 32-bit) offset delta in the target
location to be freely chosen and generated by the compiler,
supporting (H˜). The target register or memory location pair
has a different (32-bit) delta generated for each of the pair.
B. Double Floats
Double precision plaintext 64-bit floats (‘double’) are encoded
as two (encrypted) 32-bit integers, the top and bottom bits re-
spectively of a 64-bit IEEE754 standard integer representation.
Definition 5. Let ∗¨ denote the plaintext double precision
floating point multiplication on the IEEE 754 encoding of
double (64-bit) floats as 64-bit integers rendered as two 32-bit
integers, and similarly for other operations and relations.
Let [∗¨] be the corresponding operation in the cipherspace
domain on two pairs of encrypted 32-bit integers. Then the
FxA multiplication instruction on encrypted 64-bit double
operands in the (pairs of) registers r1, r2 respectively, writing
to (the pair) register r0 has semantics:
r0 ← (r1 [−
2] kE1 ) [ ∗¨ ] (r2 [−
2] kE2 ) [+
2] kE0 (11)
where kEi , i = 0, 1, 2 are encrypted 64-bit constants embedded
in the instruction. That is written muld r0 r1 r2 k
E
0 k
E
1 k
E
2 in
assembler, following the 32-bit pattern, but with a d suffix on
the root of the mnemonic. The operation is atomic (1).
The pattern for the compiled code emitted for double
floating point expressions and statements on the encrypted
computing platform follows exactly that for 32-bit floating
point expressions and statements (which follows the 32-bit
integer pattern) but with these ‘d’ instructions instead. Exactly
one new arithmetic instruction that writes is issued per each
compiler construct for expressions or a write to a location
holding a source code variable. The instruction contains one
64-bit (encrypted) constant that allows the 64-bit (i.e. 2× 32-
bit) offset delta in the target location to be freely chosen and
generated by the compiler, supporting (H˜).
C. Short Basic Types and Casts
Machine code instructions that act on encrypted ‘short’ (16-
bit) or ‘char’ (8-bit) integers are unneeded for C because short
integers are promoted to 32-bits ones at first use.
The compiler instead generates casts following the principle
(H˜) (emitting any one instruction that writes entails managing
it to vary to the fullest extent possible across recompilations).
For C, the 13 basic types (signed/unsigned char, short, int,
long, long long integer, and float and double precision float,
also the single bit bool type) have to be inter-converted. Here
follows the cast for encrypted signed 32-bit ‘int’ to encrypted
signed 16-bit ‘short’. The compiler-issued code moves the
integer 16 places left and then 16 places right again using one
multiplication and one division (read on for improvement):
C
L[D : (short)x]r = (mce,∆e) (12)
(mc0,∆x) = C
L[D : x]r
mce = mc0; mul r r E [2
16] E [∆x] kE ;
div r r E [216] kE E [∆e]
Those are short form instructions mul r0 r1 k
E kE1 k
E
2 and
div r0 r1 k
E kE1 k
E
2 with semantics r0←(r1[−]k
E
1 ) [∗] k
E [+] kE0
and r0←(r1[−]k
E
1 ) [ / ] k
E [+] kE0 . The constants k, ∆e are
freely chosen for these two ‘arithmetic instructions that write’,
in support of (H˜).
But (a) the compiler must avoid encryptions of 216 always
appearing. Instead a register r1 can be loaded with the encryp-
tion of a random number k1 and then the full-form instructions
of Table I instead of the short forms can be used, with r1 [−] k
E
2
in place of E [216], where k2=k1−2
16. Then the encrypted
constants that appear in the code are uniformly distributed.
Also (b) the top 16 bits should be filled randomly, but that is
taken care of in the final offset delta ∆e. That the difference
between k1, k2 for (a) is constant at 2
16 across recompilations
does not help an adversary as the processor arithmetic does
not work on instruction constants (4).
Our FxA instruction set provides integer-to-float (and vice
versa) conversion primitives for the platform. Each embeds
encrypted constants that offset inputs and outputs arbitrarily
beneath the encryption, as required by (3). The compiler needs
just one such instruction for an integer/float cast, containing
one constant allowing one arbitrary offset beneath the encryp-
tion in the target location to be generated, supporting (H˜).
VI. ARRAYS AND POINTERS
There is a natural and there is an efficient way to bootstrap
integer computation to an array A of n integers and both
will be discussed briefly. The natural way is to imagine a
set of variables A0, A1, . . . for the entries of the array. That
allows the compiler to translate a lookup A[i] as a compound
expression ‘(i=0)?A0:(i=1)?A1:. . . ’, while a write A[i]=x can
be translated to ‘if (i=0) A0=x else if (i=1) A1=x else . . . ’.
The entries get individual offsets from nominal ∆A0, ∆A1,
. . . in the obfuscation scheme maintained by the compiler.
A. Single Shared Array Offset
While the natural approach is logically correct, it makes array
access have complexity O(n). It can trivially be improved
to O(log2 n) but that is still an overhead. So we have also
explored an efficient approach: array A’s entries share the same
offset ∆A from their nominal value beneath the encryption.
Then pointer-based access becomes easier to generate code
for. At compile time where in the array the pointer will point at
runtime is unknown, but the shared offset for all array entries
may be relied on. Pointers p must be declared with the array:
restrict A int *p;
With this approach, the compiler constructs the dereference ∗e
of an expression e that is a pointer into A as follows. It first
emits code mce that evaluates the pointer in register r with a
randomly generated offset ∆e beneath the encryption:
(mce,∆e) = C
L[D : e]r
It emits a load instruction lw r (kE)r containing (encrypted)
displacement constant k=−∆e that compensates the offset
∆e in the address in r. The processor does the calculation
aE = r [−]E [∆e] that produces the encrypted address aE and
passes it as-is for lookup by the memory unit.4 The entry
retrieved from memory has the shared offset ∆A and the
compiler emits a short-form add instruction add r r kE with
semantics r←r[+]kE and k=∆′r−∆A to change it to a new,
freely chosen offset ∆′r in r. The complete code emitted is:
C
L[D : ∗e]r = (mc,∆) (13)
mc = mce; lw r (E [−∆e])r
add r r E [∆′r −∆A]
An indexed array lookup A[i] is handled by dereferencing
a pointer *(A+i). Does that follow the principle (H˜)? The
add instruction is varied as the compiler chooses, but the
load instruction is not. However, a load instruction is not an
arithmetic instruction and (H˜) refers only to those. A load
instruction is a copy from RAM and should just copy. Where
in RAM the read is physically mapped to is up to the hardware
and should be varied by it independently. A test of whether
two encrypted addresses are equal based on if they retrieve
the same values from RAM does not break encryption because
the lookup is of the encrypted not the decrypted address. The
general compilation technique for dealing with this situation
(‘hardware aliasing’; the term originated in [29]) in which
the program has different names for one RAM location is
described in [30], [31] (the memory address must be saved for
reuse in reads between consecutive writes, not recalculated; in
particular, the classical frame pointer register is used to save
the stack pointer register on entry to a subroutine and for
restoration at subroutine exit).
Writing an array entry is more problematic, because it
should change the offset delta beneath the encryption. Because
that is shared across the whole array, therefore every array
entry must be rewritten to the new offset whenever one is
written, an O(n) ‘write storm.’ But the n − 1 writes to the
other array entries all install the same offset. That contradicts
the principle (H˜) that each such arithmetic write must exercise
the possibilities for variation to the maximum. Each instruction
could vary independently, but is constrained by the convention
that the offset ∆A holds array-wide. Therefore this ‘efficient’
approach is wrong. Nevertheless, because it is a straightfor-
ward extension of the integers-only compilation technique, it is
the one presently implemented in our compiler. Although solo
array reads are more efficient, blinding which array element
is really being read from requires a ‘read storm’ like the write
storm, so it is not more efficient if a compiler codes for that.
B. One Offset per Array Entry
An array may also be viewed as a single (encrypted) n× 32
bit long integer variable A, with a single n × 32 bit offset
∆A=(∆Ai)
n−1
0 beneath the encryption. Extending Defn. 2:
4In our own prototype processor for encrypted computing, a frontend to
the address translation lookaside buffer (TLB) memoises [27] the encrypted
address to a physically backed sub-range of the full memory address space.
The memoisation is changed randomly at every write through it, so a physical
observer sees a random pattern approximating oblivious RAM (ORAM) [28].
Definition 6. Encryption of n×32-bit integers x concatenates
the encryptions of the 32-bit components:
xE = E [x] = E [x0 . . . . . xn−1] = E [x0] . . . . .E [xn−1]
The compiler must generate a ‘write storm’ to the whole of
the array after writing one entry and changing its offset delta
because it does not know at compile time which entry Ai (and
its associated offset delta ∆Ai) will be rewritten at runtime,
so it must plan to rewrite all – or rewrite none, which would
go against (H˜). Each write in the write storm contributes new
trace information – the new delta offset – and hence entropy.
As stated above, this is the correct approach but our own
prototype compiler does not yet implement it. The software
engineering perspective is not clear as to whether moving
forward to single but long integer deltas, or multiple 32-bit
deltas like those already used for doubles, is the least difficult
development route. The ‘single shared 32-but offset’ ∆A not
(∆Ai) approach for an array A is what is currently in use.
VII. STRUCTS
C ‘structs’ are records with fixed fields. The approach the
compiler takes is to maintain a different offset per field, per
variable of struct type. That is, for a variable x of struct type
with fields .a and .b the compiler maintains offsets ∆x.a and
∆x.b. It is as though there were two variables, x.a and x.b.
In the case of an array A the entries of which are structs
with fields .a and .b, the compiler maintains two separate sets
of offsets ∆Ai.a and ∆Ai.b and so on recursively if the fields
are themselves structs. Updating one field in one entry changes
the associated offset and is accompanied by a ‘write storm’ of
adjustments over the stripe through the array consisting of that
same field in all entries. That is more efficient than a storm
to all fields, so for more efficient computing in this context,
array entries should be split into structs whenever possible.
VIII. UNIONS
The obfuscation scheme in a union type such as
union {struct{int a; float b[2]; }; double c[2]; }
engages compatible offset schemes for the component types.
The offset scheme for the struct will have the pattern (in 32-
bit words) x, y0, y1, with x the offset for the int and y0, y1
the offsets for the float array entries, while the pattern for the
double array will be u0, v0, u1, v1.
union{struct{ int a
x
; float b[2]
y0, y1
; }; double c[2]
u0, v0, u1, v1
; }
The resolution is x=u0=α, y0=v0=β, y1=u1=γ, v1=δ for
a scheme α, β, γ, δ. That is the least restrictive obfuscation
scheme forced by the union layout here, and it means that a
write to one target field within the union can be just that.
With our compiler’s present (inadequate) solution for arrays,
y0=y1 so β=γ, and u0=u1 so α=γ, and v0=v1 so β=δ. That
gives α=β=γ=δ and the scheme α, α, α, α of offsets. That
needs a write storm to update the deltas across the whole union
after an update to just one field. Not only is that inefficient,
but it carries no extra entropy into the trace, contradicting (H˜).
IX. THEORY
By a trace T of a program at runtime is meant the sequence of
writes to registers and memory locations. If a location is read
for the first time without it having previously been written in
the trace, then that is not part of the trace but an input to it.
Trace T is a random variable, varying from recompilation
to recompilation of the same source code by the compiler. The
compiler freely chooses delta offset schemes for each point in
the code as described in previous sections, and the probability
distribution for T depends on the distribution of those choices.
After a simple assignment to a register r, the trace is longer by
one: T ′ = T⌢〈r=E [v]〉. Let H(T ) be the entropy of trace T
in this stochastic setting. Let fT be the probability distribution
of T , then the entropy is the expectation
H(T ) = E[− log2 fT ] (14)
The increase in entropy from T to T ′ (it cannot decrease as T
lengthens) is the number of bits of unpredictable information
added. A flat distribution fT = k (constant) uniquely has
maximal entropy H(T ) = log2(1/k). Only this fragment of
information theory will be required: adding a maximal entropy
signal to a random variable with any distribution at all on a n-
bit space gives another maximal entropy, i.e., flat, distribution.
If the offset ∆r beneath the encryption is chosen randomly
and independently with flat distribution by the compiler, so it
has maximal entropy, then H(T ′) = H(T )+32, because there
are 32 bits of unpredictable information added in via the 32-bit
delta to the 32-bit value beneath the encryption, so the 32-bit
sum value plus delta varies with (32-bit) maximal entropy.
Although per instruction the compiler has free choice in
accord with (H˜), not all the register/memory write instructions
issued by the compiler are jointly free as to the offset delta
for the target location – it is constrained to be equal at the
beginning and end of a loop, and in general at any point where
two control paths join:
Definition 7. An instruction emitted by the compiler that
adjusts the offset in location l to a final value common with
that in a joining control path is a trailer instruction.
Trailer instructions come in sets for each location l for a
control path join, with one member per path. Each in the set
for l is last to write to l in a control path before the join.
An example occurs at return from a subroutine. The final
offsets per location must be the same at all exit points from
the subroutine and the arithmetic instructions that write that
make them so make up the trailer instruction sets.
Because running through the same instruction twice, or a
instruction with the same delta offset for the target location a
second time, does not add any new entropy (the delta offset is
already determined for the second encounter by the first en-
counter), the total entropy in a trace can be counted as follows:
Lemma 1. The entropy of a trace compiled according to (H˜)
is 32(n+m) bits, where n is the number of distinct arithmetic
instructions that write in the trace, counted once only per set
if they are one of a set of trailer instructions, and once each
if they are not, and m is the number of input words.
Recall that ‘input’ is provided by those instructions that read
for a first time in the trace a location not written in it earlier.
Observing data at any point in the trace that has been
written by a program instruction (or read from a location in
memory that has not yet been written) sees variation across
recompilations. The compiler principle (H˜) guarantees that
every opportunity provided by the emission of an arithmetic
instruction that writes is taken by the compiler as a point at
which new variation is introduced. But at ‘trailer’ instructions
as defined above the compiler jointly organises several in-
structions to provide the same final delta to a location and
that is sometimes unnecessary, because that location is never
read again. Then the variation the compiler has introduced is
not maximal, because it could be increased by varying deltas
independently among the trailer instructions.
To make the trailer instruction synchronisation necessary we
consider that the code might be embedded in any surrounding
code, including that which reads all locations affected. Then
the trailer synchronisation is necessary and the compiler has
done the best job possible in terms of introducing as much
entropy as possible.
Proposition 1. The entropy of a program trace compiled ac-
cording to (H˜) with synchronisation only at trailer instructions
before different control paths join is maximal over the space
of all possible variations of the constant parameters in the
machine code, given that it works correctly in any context.
The proposition implies a full 32 bits of entropy in the
variation beneath the encryption must exist in any location
at any point in the trace where the location has been written,
or not yet being written, is read. The datum in that location
has no other option for coming to be. This is the result (EP)
obtained by structural induction in [11]:
Corollary 1. The probability across different compilations by
a compiler that follows principle (H˜) that any particular 32-
bit value has encryption E [x] in a given register or memory
location at any given point in the program at runtime is
uniformly 1/232.
That is what formally implies (⋓

), relative to the security of
the encryption. But a stronger result can now be obtained from
the understanding in the lemma and proposition above:
Definition 8. Two data observations in the trace are (delta)
dependent if they are of the same register at the same point,
are input and output of a copy instruction, or are of the same
register after the last write to it in a control path before a join
and before the next write.
If the trace is observed at two (in general, n) independent
points, the variation is maximal possible:
Theorem 1. The probability across different compilations by
a compiler that follows principle (H˜) that any n particular 32-
bit values in the trace have encryptions E [xi], provided they
are pairwise (delta) independent, is 1/232n.
Each dependent pair reduces the entropy by 32 bits.
X. DISCUSSION
Theorem 1 quantifies exactly the cross-correlation that exists
beneath the encryption in a trace from compiled code where
the compiler is built according to the principle (H˜) (every
arithmetic instruction that writes is varied to the maximal ex-
tent possible across recompilations). It ‘names and shames’ the
points in the trace where the induced variation is necessarily
weak because of the nature of computation, and statistical
influences from the original source code may show through.
For example, if the code runs a loop summing the same
value again and again into an accumulator, then looking at
the accumulator shows an observer E [a + i ∗ b + δ] for a
constant offset δ. That is an arithmetic series with unknown
starting point and constant step and it is likely to be one of the
relatively few short-stepping paths, and that can be leveraged
into a dictionary attack on the encryption.
A compiler built following the principle (H˜) does as well
as any may to avoid introducing more such weaknesses. The
only way to eliminate them is to have no loops or branches in
the object code. That would be a finite-length calculation or
unrolled bounded loop with branches embedded as t∗x+(1−
t) ∗ y calculations, where x and y are the potential outcomes
from two branches and t is the outcome of a 1/0 test.
With respect to data structures, (H˜) means that each entry
of an array must have its own individually chosen delta offset
from nominal beneath the encryption, and each write to an
array must change them all, as one must change on write and
the compiler does not know which it will be. The compiler
must emit a ‘write storm’. Reads too are necessarily more
inefficient than naively may be expected. Structs (records with
named fields) have different offsets per field, along the same
lines, but the compiler does know which will be accessed, so
there are no write storms. Unions do force equalities among
the delta offsets of their fields, but they are to be expected
from the aliasing (if it is worthwhile preserving ‘trick’ code –
type punned or aliased, writing and reading different types –
is another question, but it would break legacy codes not to).
This document has not touched on short data structures such
as short integers, but it is a problem as their natural variation
is small so they are intrinsically a good subject for dictionary
attacks. With an abundance of caution, we treat them as
integers with random high bits, and a poor consequence is
that strings are loosely packed. The text has also not touched
unsigned integers, but the compiler’s treatment is the same as
for floats – that is, they are regarded as being coded as signed
integers (with the same bits). The platform provides primitive
arithmetic operations on them in that coding (encrypted).
The treatment of short integers raises the question of
whether extra entropy could be introduced by changing to
64-bit or 128-bit plaintext words beneath the encryption,
instead of 32-bit, and correspondingly sized delta offsets from
nominal. We believe that is the correct logical inference. The
32-bit range of variation of standard-sized integers would be
swamped by a 64-bit delta introduced by the compiler and the
looped stepping example E [a+ i ∗ b+ δ above would have a
64-bit δ, so would have 264 possible origin points for the path
for any hypothetical step b, not just 232, which is too many to
examine in a practical dictionary attack. A 256-bit encryption
for 128-bit plaintext words with 128-bit deltas introduced by
the compiler could be sufficient for all practical purposes since
no measurement on the trace could then have less than 128
bits of entropy (Corollary 1 makes this observation).
A particular concern is whether interactions with memory
reveal too much. One can imagine, for example, testing if two
data values are equal beneath the encryption by seeing if, used
as addresses in a load instruction, they pull the same values
into registers. But load and store do not resolve the address
beneath the encryption. Instead they pass the literal, encrypted
address as-is to the memory unit (which is not privy to the
encryption), so identity of the encrypted addresses is what
would be tested and that is visible already to an observer.
The ‘hardware aliasing’ that multiple encryptions of the same
address causes in use in load and store from the program’s
point of view is dealt with by the compiler – it emits code to
save the address verbatim at first write for subsequent reuse.
At the current stage of development, our own proto-
type compiler (http://sf.net/p/obfusc) has near total coverage
of ANSI C with GNU extensions, including statements-as-
expressions and expressions-as-statements. It lacks longjmp,
computed goto and global data shared across different compi-
lation units (a linking issue).
XI. CONCLUSION
How to compile compound and nested C data structures for
encrypted computing extending existing compiler-based ‘ob-
fuscation’ in this context has been set out here. A single com-
piler principle is proposed – if any arithmetic instruction that
writes is emitted, then it must be varied by the compiler to the
maximal extent possible from recompilation to recompilation.
Then the compiler is ‘best possible’ in terms of introducing
entropy beneath the encryption in a program runtime trace, and
that is what provides protection against decryption attempts
in this context. The quantitative theory improves the existing
‘cryptographic semantic security relative to the security of the
encryption’ result for encrypted computing.
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